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NOTES
evidence4 3 removes the jury's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility
which might be the determining factor in the ultimate verdict." Similarly,
where the jury receives an improper instruction,45 the right to have the jury
apply the correct principles of law to the facts will be abridged if the error
remains uncorrected during trial.
Concededly, some writ applications, filed on frivolous grounds, will to
some extent disrupt trial proceedings. However, most attorneys will be
aware of possible adverse reactions by the trial judge in such cases and will
accordingly limit their writ applications to meritorious claims. Therefore, in
those cases where an error has destroyed any possibility of a proper jury
trial, the appellate courts, by being more lenient in granting supervisory
writs, can protect the right to a jury trial without hampering judicial
efficiency or invading the province of the jury until it is absolutely
necessary.46
Edward R. Greenlee
A NEW STANDARD OF FAULT FOR THE REPORTORIAL PRIVILEGE
Following a highly publicized divorce proceeding, Mary Alice Fire-
stone obtained a $100,000 libel award against Time magazine for publishing
a misstatement' of the trial judge's remarks 2 concerning the grounds for the
43. E.g., Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966).
44. Appellate courts recognize the trial court's unique ability to judge credibility
of witnesses. E.g., Andrews v. Williams, 281 So. 2d 120 (La. 1973). Even though
proffered testimony may be included in the record, in such a situation there can be no
determination of credibility based on demeanor.
45. E.g., Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975); Bienvenu v.
Angelle, 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969).
46. There was an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate appellate review of facts at
the 1974 constitutional convention. Fear was expressed that removing appellate
review of facts would increase jury trials. Constitutional convention Vol. IX, 30th
day, pp. 50-93. Granting more supervisory writs will probably not result in more jury
trials since the facts are still reviewable on appeal.
I. The Time article read: "DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41,
heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife, a onetime
Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after
six years of marriage, one son: in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month
intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
divorce. Time appealed from the adverse judgment, 3 and contended that
liability should not be imposed without proof of "actual malice," 4 claiming
that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure. Time further argued that the actual
malice standard should be applied to the common law reportorial privilege. 5
Rejecting these arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a person does
not become a public figure simply by participating in a judicial proceeding,
and that fault, not actual malice, is the standard to be applied in determining
liability when the reportorial privilege has been raised as a defense to a
defamation action brought by a plaintiff who is not a public figure.6 Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
At common law, the tort of defamation generally involved strict
liability.' However, the issue of fault did play a limited role in determining
sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.' "Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
96 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1976).
2. The trial judge had said: "According to certain testimony in behalf of
the defendant [Mr. Firestone], extramarital escapades of the plaintiff [Mrs.
Firestone] were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr.
Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate that
defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the erotic
zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as
unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of this court that
neither party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used by the
Supreme Court of Florida.... " Id. at 963. Apparently, the trial judge equated
marital fidelity with domestication. However, on review of this finding, the
Florida Supreme Court found that a lack of domestication was not a proper
ground for divorce in that state. 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
3. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
4. If a statement is made with actual malice, it is made with knowledge that
the statement is false, or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). This term is not to be
confused with the common law notion of malice which meant "spite" or "ill
will." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 771 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
5. The reportorial privilege historically afforded immunity in defamation
actions to accurate and complete accounts of matters in the public concern. The
privilege is based on the societal value of having public affairs made known to all.
PROSSER at 830-32. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 3d Dist: 1975); Michlin v. Roberts, 318
A.2d 163 (Vt. 1974). This privilege has recently been afforded constitutional protec-
tion. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). "[T]he States may
not impose sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection." Id. at 495.
6. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether Time was at
fault in failing to use due care to insure that the published account actually conformed
to the reported proceeding. 96 S. Ct. 958, 969.
7. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1352 (1975). Plaintiff
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whether the defendant had exceeded the scope of a qualified privilege8
which had been raised as a defense. One of these defenses, the reportorial
privilege, afforded immunity for accurate reports of public proceedings.
The rationale underlying this privilege was that the reporter acts as a
substitute for the public eye, only publishing that which the public could see
or hear for itself if it were present.9 Unlike other privileges, the truth or
falsity of the reported statement was not at issue in determining whether the
defendant was at fault. Rather the reportorial privilege was considered
abused only if the report failed to conform with what actually transpired in
the reported proceeding.'
0
Fault has recently assumed special prominence as the result of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions which have applied the First Amendment guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and press to the law of defamation. A constitu-
tional requirement of fault was first announced in the 1964 landmark
decision, New York Times Company v. Sullivan" where the Court found
that the First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability in defamation
suits for statements concerning public officials unless it is shown that the
defendant published with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the
statement was false, or in reckless disregard of its truth.' 2
The actual malice test was subsequently extended to suits brought by
public figures, 13 and later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,.Inc.,14 a plurality
merely had to prove that the defendant had published a defamatory statement to a
third party to whom the communication was not privileged. The plaintiff was aided by
a presumption of injury. "The conclusive presumption of injury ... derives from
the recognition that injury to reputation is extremely difficult to demonstrate, even
when it is obvious that serious harm has resulted." Id. at 1357.
8. Qualified privileges include statements made in the legitimate interests of the
defendant or another, such as an allegation made to a policeman that plaintiff had
stolen defendant's property, communications made to one who may act in the public
interest, and fair comment on matters of public concern. The concept of privilege was
instituted to protect otherwise actionable statements where the publication of such
utterances would promote a recognized social value. For a general discussion of
qualified privileges, see PROSSER at 785-96.
9. Id. at 830.
10. See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 531 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1975); Sherwood v.
Evening News Ass'n, 239 N.W. 305 (Mich. 1931); Lehner v. Berlin Publishing Co.,
245 N.W. 685 (Wis. 1932).
1I. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper-defendant held not liable for an advertise-
ment which allegedly defamed an Alabama police commissioner).
12. Id. at 279-80.
13. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 988 U.S. 130 (1967). A public figure was
defined as one who "commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest
at the time of the publications .... ." Id. at 154. In Butts, a college football coach
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of the Court applied this strict fault standard to a private individual defamed
in a report involving a matter of public interest. 15 In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,' 6 the Court retreated from this latter extension, and redirected its
attention to whether the plaintiff was a public figure or a public official as
opposed to a private citizen, in order to determine if the actual malice
standard was to be applied. Gertz recognized that private citizens deserve
greater protection from defamation than do public individuals, since they
have not voluntarily sought publicity, 7 and because they have little access
to the media for rebuttal.' 8 Consequently, the Court limited the application
of the actual malice standard to only those plaintiffs who were public figures
or public officials. To assist future courts in determining who is a public
figure, the Court suggested two possible definitions, "one who achieves
pervasive fame and notoriety," 19 or one "who voluntarily injects himself or
is drawn into a particular public controversy." 20
The Gertz decision, however, was not confined to redefining public
figures. Additionally, the Court, in an attempt to balance reputational
interests with freedom of expression, announced a new constitutional fault
standard for private plaintiffs, requiring that the defendant at least be shown
negligent in failing to ascertain whether his statement was true or false
before liability may be imposed. 2' The actual formulation of a fault standard
was left to the states. 22
In the instant case, the Court considered for the first time whether the
was deemed a "public figure" for purposes of his suit against a national magazine for
an article about the alleged "fixing" of a football game.
14. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (issue was whether the actual malice standard would
safeguard a radio station's broadcast that labeled a magazine distributor a "smut
merchant").
15. Thus, in Rosenbloom, the Court applied the actual malice standard on the
basis of the "public" nature of the subject matter reported rather than on the basis of
the characterization of the plaintiff as a public figure or public official.
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (Plaintiff, described as a "communist" by a magazine
published by the John Birch Society, was determined not to be a public figure,
notwithstanding his participation as counsel in a celebrated trial.)
17. Id. at 344.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 351.
20. Id.
21. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199, 242 (1976).
22. "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher
or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods injurious to a private individual." 418 U.S.
at 347.
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constitutional fault standard applied in Gertz should be applied to the
common law reportorial privilege. Before reaching that issue, however, the
Court determined that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure, and that the
actual malice standard would not automatically attach on that basis. Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist applied the Gertzpublic figure test,23 and
found that Mrs. Firestone had not achieved the requisite amount of fame or
notoriety because she had not assumed "any role of especial prominence in
the affairs of society, other than Palm Beach society .... "24 Emphasiz-
ing the fact that individuals must use the judicial process to have a marriage
dissolved, the Court concluded that Mrs. Firestone had not voluntarily
chosen to publicize her divorce. Justice Rehnquist further found that the
dissolution of a marriage is not a public controversy as contemplated by
Gertz, even though the proceeding attracts a high degree of publicity.25
The Court's analysis has provided additional factors which may be
considered in determining if an individual is to be labeled a "public figure."
Because Mrs. Firestone might have been considered a public figure if her
defamation suit had been brought against a member of the Palm Beach
press," the Court's denial of national public figure status for her indicates
that the scope of the plaintiff's notoriety and the extent of the defendant's
circulation are factors to be considered before a particular individual is to be
classified as a "public figure." 2
7
In applying the "public controversy" element of the Gertz public
figure definition to the facts of the instant case, the Firestone court refused
to equate that element with all controversies of interest to the public, 28 and
23. 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976); see text at notes 19 & 20, supra.
24. Id. at 965.
25. Id.
26. As a member of the "400" of Palm Beach society, Mrs. Firestone attracted a
great amount of public attention. 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972). She appeared in the
press so often that she subscribed to a press clipping service to keep posted on the
stories written about her. 96 S. Ct. at 980. Even the Court noted that Mrs. Firestone
had achieved "especial prominence" in the Palm Beach area. Id. at 965.
27. A more extreme view would hold that the Court's denial of public figure
status to Mrs. Firestone has laid the groundwork for requiring national media
defendants to show not only that the plaintiff is a public figure but also that the
plaintiff's notoriety is national in scope before the protection of the actual malice
standard can be exercised. If this requirement is to be imposed on future national
media defendants, it may unfortunately result in a "chilling" effect on the press,
since a workable definition of a "national" public figure may prove difficult to
establish.
28. Mrs. Firestone's divorce proceeding generated a tremendous amount of
public interest; so much, in fact, that she held press conferences during the proceed-
ings to satisfy inquiries made by the press on behalf of their readers. 96 S. Ct. at 980
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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was unwilling to recognize that a highly publicized divorce proceeding is a
public controversy. The Court's retention of the term "public controversy"
in determining the applicability of the actual malice standard was criticized
in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion 29 as a return to the rejected subject
matter test of Rosenbloom.3' However, the Court's emphasis on the
involuntary nature of Mrs. Firestone's lawsuit would seem to indicate its
unwillingness to revert to the unworkable subject matter test, which did not
inquire into the voluntary character of the plaintiff's participation in the
public controversy. 3
1
After concluding that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure, and that
the actual malice standard would not attach on that basis, the Court then
faced the more difficult issue of determining whether the malice require-
ment should be applicable in defamation actions involving the reportorial
privilege. Although Time contended that the public interest in reports of
judicial proceedings warranted an application of the actual malice standard,
the Court refused to extend the standard solely on the basis of the subject
matter reported.32 Such a broad extension would have effected "substantial
depreciation of the individual's interest in protection from . . .[defama-
tory] harm[s], without any convincing assurance that such a sacrifice is
required under the First Amendment.,, 33 Despite its refusal to apply the
actual malice standard to the reportorial privilege, the Court found that the
constitution did require proof of some form of fault on the defendant's part
in order to protect freedom of expression. 34 Noting that the constitutional
requirement of fault could be assessed at any stage of the proceedings,
including the appellate level, the Court remanded the case to the state court
to determine whether Time was at fault. 35
29. Id. at 981 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that the
majority had found a divorce proceeding to be a controversy "not of the sort deemed
relevant to the 'affairs of society'. . and the public's interest not of the sort deemed
'legitimate' or worthy of judicial recognition." Id.
30. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom extended the New York Times privilege "to
all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." Id. at
43-44. This has been termed the "subject matter test" since it focuses on the activity
reported rather than on the character of the person allegedly defamed. See text &
material cited at note 14, supra.
31. 96 S. Ct. at 965.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 966.
34. The application of a fault standard provides an "adequate safeguard for the
constitutionally protected interests of the press and affords it a tolerable margin of
error ....... Id. at 967.
35. Id. at 969-70. The Court was disinclined to canvass the record in order to
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Although the case could have been easily disposed of within the
common law framework3 6 on the basis that the report failed to conform to
the proceeding, the Firestone court went further. By applying a constitu-
tional standard of fault, the Court implicitly held that the reportorial
privilege is no longer abused solely by a failure to make an accurate report.
Consequently, before liability may be imposed, a court must find not only
that the report did not conform to the proceedings but further that the
non-conformity was due to the fault of the defendant.
Because Gertz allowed each state to decide for itself the standard of
fault to be imposed,37 the Firestone majority did not formulate a standard of
negligence to be used in determining whether the reportorial privilege has
been abused. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Powell pointed out
some factors that courts could consider in determining whether a defendant
is at fault. These would include the degree to which the report failed to
conform to the proceeding, the number of sources checked before publica-
tion, the amount of time available for investigation before deadline, and the
technical nature of the subject reported.38 These factors will have to be
determine Time's fault. Justice White, dissenting, argued that the Florida Supreme
Court had already inquired into the issue of fault when it "noted the 'convincing
evidence of. . .negligence' in the case; [and] pointed out that a careful examination
of the divorce decree would have 'clearly demonstrated' that the divorce was not
grounded on adultery, as reported by Time, Inc.; and stated flatly 'this is a flagrant
example of 'journalistic negligence.' ' " Id. at 979 (White, J., dissenting).
36. See note 5 and text at note 10, supra.
37. See note 22, supra. Louisiana courts have followed LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315
when applying the Gertz fault standard. This has been interpreted to mean that in
order to be liable in a suit brought by a private individual, the "publisher must have
some knowledge which would place him on his guard, making him aware that further
research was necessary to insure the veracity of his report. ... LaBoeuf v.
Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). See
also Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). Recently
the Louisiana legislature passed an act which will allow punitive damages for both
private and public plaintiffs on a showing of "actual malice." La. Acts 1976, No. 217
§ 1, adding LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.1 to the Civil Code. For a more complete
discussion of the most recent legislation, see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature
for the 1976 Regular Session, 37 LA. L. REV. - (1976).
38. 96 S. Ct. at 970 (Powell, J., concurring). Although Time only received notice
of the divorce decree in question the evening before the magazine went to press,
Powell noted that there was "substantial evidence" that Timeexercised considerable
care in checking the accuracy of the story prior to its publication. Time checked the
story from its Palm Beach reporter against an Associated Press dispatch and an
article on the divorce from the New York Daily News. The reporter, before filing his
story, had spoken with Mrs. Firestone's attorney and the trial judge who read him
portions of the divorce decree. Powell also observed that on the face of the divorce
decree, the decision of the Florida Circuit Court "was sufficiently ambiguous to have
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assessed in light of the standard of care to be imposed upon the media. This
standard may be measured by the skill and experience normally possessed
by national professional journalists, 39 or it might be a community
standard.40
Although a negligence standard will eventually be established in each
jurisdiction on a case by case basis, the Court's failure to provide guidelines
as to what will be considered "negligent reporting" may result in undesir-
able self-censorship, as members of the press attempt to anticipate the
standard of "reasonable" journalistic conduct to be imposed after the fact
by the courts. 4' If this problem does result, the Court will have defeated the
delicate balance between reputational interests and freedom of expression
which it sought to maintain.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone represents a departure from the Gertz concept
of fault, which related solely to negligence in determining the truth or falsity
of the reported matter. As a result of Firestone, fault may now include a
negligent failure to insure conformity when the reportorial privilege has
been raised as a defense to a defamation suit brought by a non-public
plaintiff. However, the standard of fault to be applied to public plaintiffs in
cases involving the reportorial privilege is unclear. 42 Because the actual
caused reasonably prudent newsmen to read it as granting divorce on the ground of
adultery."
39. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 B, comment f, (Tent. Draft No.
21, 1975).
40. A "community standard" would be the experience of newsmen normally
found within the locality in which the defendant is employed. This standard was
applied in a case foreshadowing the result in Firestone, Gobin v. Globe Publishing
Co., 531 P.2d 76 (Kan. 1975). However, both of these alternatives would seemingly
require that the plaintiff establish the defendant's fault through the use of expert
testimony. Robertson, supra note 21, at 255. This could lead to difficulty if a
"conspiracy of silence" develops among members of the press. Should such a
conspiracy develop, it could be counteracted by the use of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to infer the negligence of the defendant without resorting to expert tes-
timony. Care should be used in applying this doctrine to defamation actions, since the
inference of negligence made by a lay jury could force an undesirably harsh
self-censorship of the press. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 B, comment f
(Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). The "conspiracy" might also be defeated by requiring the
defendant to show that he has met the standard of care expected of members of his
profession, thus relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proof in that regard. Cf.
Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public
Communication, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 650, 663-64 (1968).
41. For a discussion of the problems associated with the Gertz requirement of
negligence, see Robertson, supra note 21, at 199, 235, 250.
42. The Court failed to comment on the application of the reportorial privilege
when the plaintiff is a public figure or public official.
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malice test focuses on the defendant's knowledge of the truth or falsity of his
statement, its use appears awkward in the context of the reportorial privilege
where the reporter's knowledge of the statement's veracity is wholly
immaterial.4 3 Nevertheless, the Court might analogize this situation to
Firestone's treatment of the Gertz negligence standard and the reportorial
privilege by imposing liability on the basis of the reporter's knowledge that
his report failed to conform, or his reckless disregard of the issue of
conformity. However, such applications ignore the artificiality of the fault
standards when applied to defamation actions which do not involve the issue
of truth or falsity of the matter reported, and the Court should instead
attempt to articulate a more realistic framework which would be compatible
with all of the peculiarities of defamation law.
Paula Hazelrig Hickman
SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 10(b) and RULE 10b-5
Respondents, defrauded when the president of a small brokerage firm
induced them to invest in nonexistent escrow accounts, I brought an action
against petitioner accounting firm for damages pursuant to Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.3 Basing the cause of action on an allegation of
43. See text at note 10, supra.
I. The president of First Securities Co. of Chicago perpetrated the fraud from
1942 until 1966 by enforcing a "mail rule" in his office. All mail addressed to him
could be opened only by him, thereby preventing discovery of the fraud by others in
the company. Suit was filed against First Securities' accountants, Ernst & Ernst,
because in their review of internal audit controls of the company they failed to
discover the mail rule. For a more complete discussion of the financial misdealings,
see Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1103-04, 1109 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975), and opinions cited therein.
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Section 10(b)]: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange ...(b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." (Emphasis added).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as rule lOb-5]: "It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
19761
